GLOSSARY ENTRY (DERIVED FROM QUESTION BELOW) | ||||||
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20:08 Apr 16, 2017 |
Spanish to English translations [PRO] Art/Literary - Cinema, Film, TV, Drama / Film-related contract | |||||||
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| Selected response from: neilmac Spain Local time: 15:49 | ||||||
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Summary of answers provided | ||||
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4 +1 | derived exploitation (rights) |
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3 | derivative uses |
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derived exploitation (rights) Explanation: Same as in the kudoz query (FR-EN) i8n the link below. "... employers may only acquire derived exploitation rights, but not the author’s right as such, which remains with the employee as the creator of the work. " Example sentence(s):
Reference: http://www.proz.com/kudoz/french_to_english/cinema_film_tv_d... https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/remuneration_of_authors_final_report.pdf |
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derivative uses Explanation: I've arrived a bit late to this, but I don't believe "derived exploitation" is a meaningful translation. In the context of copyright, I'd say the equivalent is "derivative use". The legal concept of derivative use was first formalized as a rule by the courts in giving authors exclusive rights to make and sell foreign translations. In response to technological change, this concept was later extended by the judiciary to give fiction writers a say in the making of movies based on their books. In 1976, rules based on derivative use rights were defined by Congress to govern a broad range of situations. Copyright now confers to a proprietor exclusive rights over all goods substantially based on an original work. https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1986/8610/861009.PDF The current US approach, as Part I.A explains, is essentially to subsume reuses of copyrighted material under the reproduction right, thus creating a complete overlap with the idea-expression dichotomy and leaving very little work for the derivative right, in spite of the broad statutory language. Yet Congress specifically carved out forms of reuse and identified them as derivative uses—some of which fall outside the scope of the reproduction right. That must mean something. This Article suggests that we should apply different analyses to reuses that transform the content used, in ways Part II defines, versus other cases of reproduction. Otherwise, the statute’s definition of “derivative work,” and the inclusion of a derivative right in 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), is meaningless. http://www.jetlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Gervais.pdf |
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